The Ethio-Eritrean Relationship
by Konrad Licht
in context of the Seminar:
“ Discussion of the Future of Ethiopia in the
Internet”
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Institut für Ethnologie und Afrikastudien
WS 2001 / 2002
I full length version
1. Looking back
2. Early relations
3. Being in power
4. Arguing about their border
5. The international diplomacy and its failure
6. And the winner is…
7. Conclusions
II short version
The Ethio-Eritrean Conflict
I.
full length
version
1.
Looking back
If one wants to understand the today’s relationship
of these two countries, one has to look back at least to
1890. In this year, what is known as Eritrea today, became
an Italian colony. In fact it became the centre of the
Italian Empire in Africa. When this happened, the
differences and problems begun to grow between the two
nations. When the Italians took Eritrea, they also took the
Ethiopian access to the sea. The sea route was the main
access to manage in- and export. It was a kind of trade
basis. Nowadays Ethiopia has to arrange itself with
Djibouti what means high losses by paying taxes to get
their products to the sea. But that was not the only
problem, which the Italian colonialism created. The
Italians divided the Tigreans. The main people (about 40%)
of Eritrea are Tigreans. On the other side of the border is
the province of Tigray. Due to that division the Tigreans
lost influence on the political life. This problem is
extremely important because today it is the restructured
TPLF from Tigray that governs Ethiopia and the EPLF, which
is also a party from the Tigreans, governs Eritrea. One
could imagine a very harmonic relationship between these
two governments - they have the same roots and if we look
closer at the two parties, we will find out that they also
have fought together side by side to achieve their power.
But the imagination of this peaceful coexistence is not
combinable with the today’s reality. But we can look
at this issue later on.
In the first decades of the Italian colonisation, the
relation between the two countries was dominated by
co-operation. This lasted about 45 years. In 1935, the
Italian army, which exited of Eritrean soldiers, occupied
territories in Ethiopia and tried to colonise Ethiopia. But
in 1941 the Ethiopians defeated the Italians. With that
loss the Italian empire in Africa broke down. Before their
invasion there were three treaties on the demarcation on
their border. Whether these treaties should have any value
in modern times or not was debated heavily by the two
today’s governments. The Ethiopian government claims
that with the occupation of the Italians, that treaty has
no longer value, since the Italians broke their promise.
The Eritrean governments on the other side used this
loophole to start a conflict that escalated into a massive
war. There are many different maps available where the
border has gone more to the south and where it moved
further to Eritrea. Eritrea wanted to rely on the map of
the Italians.
One must be aware of the impact of the Italian colonialism
on the relationship between the two countries: The Italians
split what used to be brothers. They built up differences
between them. And then they send the Eritrean brothers
against the Ethiopians brothers. What has been created by
the Italian period are the differences between the two
countries. Of course there had been also differences
between them before the Italians arrived, but the
colonisation of Eritrea put the differences between them
onto a extremely higher level. Throughout Eritrea can be
heard, that Eritrea is the better Ethiopia. Of course, the
colonisation had made what some might call
„improvements“. A small working class has been
built up and administration has been more built up. This
led to a kind of Eritrean identity, which the post-Italian
government under the EPLF wanted to widen. One reaction to
this is that a feeling in Ethiopia was established, that
the Eritreans rejected them. In one conclusion: The Italian
colonialism divided the two brothers, and this division
leaves many traces.
2. Early relations
After a non-extreme period where Eritrea was kept under
British administration, Eritrea was linked to Ethiopia.
Just like the good old days? It could have become like
this, but it went towards a different direction. Observers
could have predicted problems, but, somehow, the two
countries were left alone with their problems. The Eritrean
Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) wanted to solve these
problems. Or one could also think that they wanted to use
these problems for their purpose. Anyway, they started to
fight for an independent Eritrea. They were not alone. The
ELF had the same aim. In the northern province, the TPLF
was established by the EPLF. The TPLF has the same Tigrean
root, so it was very closely linked. Also their language
linked them. The TPLF was trained and supported by the
EPLF. One cannot overstress their familiarity. The leaders
were friends who studied together and the people who
supported them had the same social background. But: the
EPLF was Eritrean and the TPLF on the Ethiopian side. What
they both had in common too, was their aim: the struggle
against the Ethiopian dictatorship. The EPLF wanted Eritrea
to be independent. The TPLF wanted Tigray to become either
independent or to take part in the government. The TPLF
supported the wish of the EPLF for an independent Eritrea.
The EPLF on the other hand claimed that Tigray has not the
historical and political right for independence. In the
eyes of the EPLF the aim for the TPLF should be a
democratical Ethiopian. I think, that the EPLF wanted the
TPLF to govern Ethiopia also to be sure, that the Ethiopian
government goes along with the line of Eritrea. If the two
parties could govern the countries, it is very likely to
imagine a kind of troubleless neighbourhood. The two
parties came to power, but a troubleless togetherness was
not achieved. But first I want to stay a bit with their
struggle.
As mentioned, the two parties that were opposition
movements in the beginning have the same roots. They
presented similar ideologies. Both came out of student
movements, and as it was common, student movements in that
time presented often an ideology that had something to do
with Marxism. But the two movements agreed not completely
with each other. The TPLF thought that the main problem of
Ethiopia was the ethnical dominance of the Amhara - not the
class differences like in classical Marxism. So the TPLF
thought early very much along ethnical lines: The Tigreans
were those who get exploited by the Amhara. The EPLF on the
other hand tried to loose this kind of ethnical thinking.
What they needed was an unity among Eritreans. Because both
parties came out of the Tigreans, this difference in
thinking was a direct confrontation. Another problem in the
early days of the movements was that they were not alone:
the EPLF had problems with oppositions that were fighting
for power and the TPLF had problems with oppositions in
Tigray. The TPLF found itself between the fronts: on the
one hand they wanted to stay in good relationship with
their older brother, on the other hand they wanted to
arrange themselves with other movements inside Ethiopia.
This let to misunderstand able and overlapping
relationships. As the TPLF had to struggle with oppositions
in Tigray, they cut off the military support for the EPLF.
The EPLF reacted to this kind of breaking their trust by
cutting off the biggest emergency route to Tigray in 1985.
Also because this happened in a period of famine, this led
to a break off of their relations. Three years later, they
arranged themselves again to a marriage of necessarity.
Both were in need of military support. The TPLF supported
the EPLF in their struggle for independence and the EPLF
fought against oppositions. Together they achieved what
they were fighting for. 1991 the TPLF came to power. They
restructured themselves into the EPRDF. The EPRDF presented
the end of dictatorship and military regime. They proposed
at least officially a new democratical Ethiopia: A
government that accepts opposition, as it is a government
for their people. In the first period of power, they asked
the AAU to take part in creating a new charter. The
University should be given the possibility to create their
own charter on a democratical basis. The hope for a change
in the right direction seemed to be realistic. And then the
line of the EPRDF changed: They did less and less take care
of the opinions of the peoples of Ethiopia and begun to
take decisions without respecting democracy. In 1993 the
EPLF achieved independence for Eritrea. What began now was
that two movements, which had fought with weapons for
power, began to govern and how they went on making policy
with weapons is a terrible history of war as a political
strategy.
3. Being in power
In the first discussions of the new governments, the two
parties wanted to achieve a harmonic co-operation. Their
economical network was extremely linked to each other.
Eritreas manufacturing products and salt had a great impact
on the Ethiopian market. And Ethiopia was the main trade
partner for Eritrea. Economically appeared huge problems
between them. Ethiopia paid attention that they can exist
without dependence on Eritrea. The Tigrean government
started a development program for the province of Tigray.
The earlier governments paid no attention to that region,
and Tigray had barely survived as a kind of transit between
Eritrea and the rest of Ethiopia. With the EPRDF in power,
these priorities changed: in Tigray should and could be
produced the products that were manufactured in Eritrea.
Tigray became concurrent to the ex-Italian colony. For
Tigray, it became a central element to replace Eritrea.
Eritrea of course was not confirm with loosing their trade
position. Real independence would mean being economically
independent. One big symbol for real independence is an own
currency. As Ethiopia refused to deal in the new introduced
Eritrean Nafka, the blockage of the two states became
clear. What then started were hard accusations in the
media. Each side claimed that the other side wanted to make
the life of the other hard. The other side reacted with a
stronger accusation on each accusation. Another thing that
came between them was the discrimination of Eritreans in
Ethiopia and Ethiopians in Eritrea. The governments accused
people of being dangerous to the security of their nation.
Many people were deported from both sides . Thousands of
them hang around today in the streets of the cities and get
no support from the government. They serve as silent
creators of the enemy-imagine. Both parties became
frightened that the other one wants to destroy their power.
It could be heard that the EPLF saw the only enemy in
Ethiopia within the TPLF clique, the party that was ones so
close to them. The EPRDF on the other hand wanted the
Eritrean EPLF to be weakened or toppled. Both started to
support, create, and finance oppositions groups. The
governments did not pick up their guns against each other,
but they told others to pick up their guns.
And in this difficult period of their relationship, it was
Eritrea that turned their eyes to a problem that longs back
to the Italian period: The Border problem.
4. Arguing about their border
One may really ask oneself why these governments fought
against each other for such a small and marginal land. The
largest part what was fought for is some 100 km² big: the
Badme area. The Italians used the power of cards when they
included this area into their territory. As mentioned
before, there were three treaties. And Italy broke all off
them by occupying Northern Ethiopia. What was left is a
problem that was never really solved. Who has the
legitimacy to claim that this land belongs to them? After
the Italians, it was kept under Ethiopian administration.
And it was first again discussed in 1970. In that year the
TPLF and the ELF discussed about this area. During that
discussion, the EPLF assisted the TPLF and fought back the
ELF. The border issue was raised again in August 1997. In
the context of the bad economic relations, which I
presented before, the President of Eritrea wrote a letter
to the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. In this letter he
claimed the bad border situation and wanted Ethiopia to
take measures against this. Also he suggested a committee
to look at this issue. Eritrea saw in the border discussion
a possibility to put some pressure onto Ethiopia. Eritrea
wanted Ethiopia to rethink its politics.
The demanded commission met in November 1997. But the
parties could not find any conclusions. While the second
meeting was held, a small group of Eritrean soldiers
already entered the disputed zone. This happened on the 6th
of May in 1998. What then really happened can only be read
in the stars. The Ethiopian side argued that the aggression
started from the Eritrean soldiers that entered the Badme
zone. The Eritrean side claims that the violence arose from
the Ethiopian police. However: Eritrea was prepared for
that aggression. They held back a massive army, which was
ready to enter Badme. The Eritreans started an offensive.
By threat of force, Eritrea wanted Ethiopia to negotiate.
As a reaction, the Ethiopian Prime Minister warned with all
activities that are necessary on the 13th of May. Both
countries prepared themselves for war.
5. The international diplomacy and its failure
In this period of the conflict, several third parties
offered their assistance to solve the conflict peacefully.
Ethiopia and Eritrea accepted a team that consisted of
diplomats from the US and Rwanda. This commission regarded
the conflict only as a discussion about the demarcation of
the border. They did not or did not want to see the deeper
causes of the conflict. The US-Rwanda delegation suggested
a withdrawal of the Eritreans and Ethiopian administration
. This seemed to press the guilt only on one party.
Ethiopia of course quickly accepted the plan, but Eritrea
asked for some details to be clarified first. Ethiopia used
this time to mobilise their army. With the US-RWANDA team
on their back, Ethiopia seemed to start to make the rules
of this tragic game. Eritrea on the other seemed to loose
influence and the possibility to put pressure onto
Ethiopia. On the 5th of June, Ethiopia started an airforce
bombing on Asmara airport. Eritreas answer were bombings on
Mekelle, where they hit also a school. Seeming to loose
influence and feeling misunderstood, Eritrea demanded an
OAU initiative. In the first protocol of the OAU, it was
noted that the Badme area did not necessarily belong to
Ethiopia. But they also referred mainly to the US-RWANDA
peace plan with the difference that they suggested a
withdrawal of both armies. Eritrea had bare issue to these
meetings. The headquarter was situated in Addis Ababa and
also that Djibouti was highly involved into the delegation,
was for Eritrea a sign, that the OAU peace plan was
standing on one side. Eritrea had also difficulties and
clashes about the Djibouti to Eritrea. Diplomacy made no
real progress. Ambassadors of both countries addressed the
UN. But the role of the UN was also not as it could have
been. The UN thought the OAU to be the best way to achieve
peace. They urged to stop all weapon deals with the two
countries. Both governments found this extremely
provocative. Ethiopia saw a parallel to the embargo of 1936
when weak Ethiopia fought against strong Italy. This
embargo can be seen as a turning point for the relationship
between Ethiopia and the international community. Every
diplomatic negotiation failed and preparations for major
offensives started. On the 27th of January 1999 Meles
Zenawi gave forewarnings of war and started a major
offensive on the 5th of February 1999.
Since that day the battle quickly escalated into the
biggest battle in Africa since WW II. Eritrea was well
installed and protected by a surrounding minefield. What
Ethiopia did was sending soldiers wave by wave into sure
death. This lasted until most mines were exploded and the
Eritrean soldiers were out of munitions. Ethiopia called
this 3-day wave strategy „Operation sunset“
which is still today glory celebrated . On the 26th of
February the Eritrean troops were fought back.
6. And the winner is...
A day after its defeat Eritrea, accepted the OAU framework
agreement. At that point they had nothing to loose since
the demanded withdrawal was achieved by force. Ethiopia on
the other side could not accept anymore since an acceptance
would mean, that they had to leave the area that costed
more than 10.000 of their soldiers. The EPRDF argued that
the acceptance of Eritrea was nothing more but a tactical
move to save time. The following days were defined by
mistrust. No party thought or wanted to think that the
opposition really wishes peace. The war at the border
continued. Now it was Eritrea that put Ethiopia under
pressure to sign the OAU framework. 10 month earlier it was
Ethiopia who put pressure onto Eritrea to sign the same
framework. Ethiopia demanded a new OAU process. In July
1999, the OAU presented the „Modalities for the
implementation of the OAU framework“ . Ethiopia
presented itself still sceptical but accepted the
framework.
The UN and the USA published that this was a great process
and the beginning of peace. But the two governments even
intensified their propaganda and their support of
oppositions. The NATO established a security zone along the
border, where no army of the two nations were allowed to be
present. The direct confrontations could be ended and one
can even say that the border conflict has been solved or at
least is on a good way to be solved. What remains is their
relationship: the governments still point there fingers at
each other and there is no sign of diplomacy between them.
The war has divided them. Probably forever. About 500.000
men are said to be killed in this war. Many have been
deported and lost their homes and futures.
7. Conclusions
The conflict between the two states is not only an example
of the failure of establishing a new state and peaceful
relations but also an example of failure of diplomacy on
both levels: on the regional and international level. Of
course the main responsibility lies with the two parties.
It seems to be easier to use war as a political strategy
than to run a country peacefully. The main cause of the
escalation of the conflict is that no party - neither the
two governments nor the UN nor the US nor the OAU - was
willing to address the deeper causes of the conflict. The
border discussion was only a pretext. What rests are the
difficult economic relations and the deep resentment of the
wish of the Eritreans to be excluded from Ethiopia. The
Ethiopians felt that the Eritreans rejected them. The
defence of territorial sovereignty has been carried out as
if there were no international observers. And one should
not forget that the main actors in this conflict were the
TPLF and the EPLF that are seasoned guerrilla soldiers.
They came to power with the use of weapons. They fought
together against the Ethiopian dictatorship. When they came
to power they were confronted with several problems. They
were facing oppositions; they were facing famine and
difficult economic positions. They used the image of a
dangerous enemy to reduce the importance of the problems
they were facing. When the war escalated, the voices
against their own government went down. First of all, the
government should handle the external danger. And now as
the hot war is over, the problems appear again. And the
voices of oppositions can be heard again more loudly, also
within the governing party. Somehow the governments of
Ethiopia and Eritrea have to deal with them. All problems
that can not be solved are a kind of platform for
oppositions. If a government cannot solve the present
problems, why not give the chance to a different
government? The Ethiopian government is afraid of loosing
power. And they try everything to stay in power. They never
really stopped using guns for achieving and staying in
power. This is what happened when the police entered the
campus of the AAU and massacred students. Intellectuals are
the most dangerous danger for fighting for a change in
politics. The EPRDF knows that. They themselves came out of
a student movement. They still use violence and violation
of human rights. The tension inside the horn of Africa that
appeared in the context of the fighting against terrorism
could be another chance for the Ethiopian government to
legitimise their violent power. In the context of the
Anti-terror war Ethiopia could ones again fight against
their oppositions and this time with broad support and
appreciation of the worlds most powerful nation.
The radical changes inside Ethiopia over the decades all
have one thing in common: the discrimination of oppositions
and the use of force to keep them down. I think, it will
last a very long time until this will change. It will last
even longer until the wounds that the violence of those who
are in power created begin to heal.
The TPLF and EPLF fought against violent power. With their
coming to power, they surely made improvements. But : being
at power always brings the risk that what they were
fighting against will be forgotten. In their times of
rebellion, hope for a better Ethiopia was a central
element. Making changes and giving the people more power
and respect. With the coming to power this kind of hope
became past and was put into the hands of other rebellions.
Into the hands of oppositions. Good way of making policy is
accepting changes. But those who are in power are always
concerned about staying in power, not loosing it. The real
meaningful solved task by those being in power now was the
changing of the conventional way of thinking in the context
of policy. They ended decades of dictatorships. They
brought in the idea of a different policy. But they stopped
being open for changes. They even fight against everything
that could awaken a different way of thinking. Their task
was made ad absurdum. They started to dictate the media,
they started to hide problems, they pick up the guns
against those who want to tell what should be changed, and
they started to fight against different thoughts. And they
started to violate human rights. Guardians of the human
freedom are always those who are not in power, are always
the rebels. And with rebels I do not only mean those who
are looking for a massive change in politics, but those who
are supporting a change in the consciousness of the people.
II.
Short version
The
Ethio-Eritrean Conflict
The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has its roots in
their histories. The two nations were ones very closely
linked. Even today the government cannot deny their same
roots. One can say that when the Italians started to
colonise what is today’s Eritrea, the basis for the
conflict was built up. With the colonisation of the
Italians, Eritrea moved into a different direction than
Ethiopia did. A small worker class was built up, and more
importantly, a different identity was formed. First, the
relation between the two countries was friendly. But with
the occupation of the Italians, the dream of peaceful
coexistence had come to an abrupt end. The Italian army,
which existed of Eritrean men, tried to colonise Ethiopia.
Before that outbreak of violence the two countries agreed
on a map, that marked their borders. Today Ethiopia argues
that this treaty has no longer value since the Italians
ignored their part of the treaty. Eritrea on the other side
used this misunderstanding to present a reachable conflict.
They started to fight for a small part at the border. But
one who looks closer at this conflict that escalated so
quickly into the biggest battle of Africa since WW II, must
recognise that the reasons for this war have a deeper
cause.
After Ethiopia defeated the Italian army, Eritrea was under
autonomy linked to Ethiopia. But soon, the voices for
independence appeared in Eritrea. One of the main parties,
which were formed for that goal, was the EPLF. In northern
Ethiopia, the province of Tigray, a small brother of the
EPLF was formed: the TPLF. The TPLF fought together with
its older brother against the dictatorship in Ethiopia. In
1991, the TPLF (which restructured itself and renamed
itself into EPRDF) came to power in Addis Ababa. In 1993
the EPLF achieved the independence of Eritrea and became
government. Both parties had fought together for power, but
there were also differences and problems between them
during their struggle. The TPLF had to arrange itself with
other parties in Ethiopia, which were against the aim of
the EPLF. Their relationship was also under pressure since
they presented different ideologies: the TPLF thought very
much inside ethnical lines - they followed Marxism but saw
not the class differences as the main problem, but the
political dominance of the Amhara. The EPLF on the other
hand wanted to loose the thinking along ethnic lines, in
order to built up an Eritrean identity. That difference
would mean no big deal, if their ethnical roots
weren’t the same ones. Tensions like these arose
early and started to boil on a little flame.
When Eritrea became independent, the situation changed. The
first months, they were still looking for an harmonic
co-operation, but their political strategy made it clear
that each party went in a different direction. One of the
most visible reasons is their economic relationship that
became worse and worse. Eritrea wanted to act as
independent as possible but at the same time did not want
to loose the market in Ethiopia for its products. The EPRDF
started a development program for the northern part of
Ethiopia. The aim: to replace the importance of Eritrean
imports. The more this difficult relationship became clear,
the more the two governments started to block each other.
When Ethiopia refused to deal in the new Eritrean currency,
this came to a point, which Eritrea did not want to accept.
Both started to fear that the other wants to destroy their
future. They started to see the other one as a danger. The
two parties that were ones so closely linked became
enemies. What followed was that the EPLF started to support
oppositions in Ethiopia which were against the EPRDF. And
the EPRDF on the other hand started to organise and finance
oppositions to the EPLF. The Media was used for propaganda,
and is still used for that purpose today. The creating of
the enemy-image of both side was in one way wanted and
appreciated. If a new government has a foreign enemy, the
voices inside the country against the party that govern it
loose importance. First, the outside enemy has to be
defeated, then we can look patiently at the problems inside
the own government. The war was used to keep potential
oppositions down. To which extend is not really clear. But
some oppositions groups argue strongly today, that the war
was also used to reduce the basis for oppositions by
sending them to death in this war. One can read this kind
of interpretation against the Ethiopian government on the
Oromo webside (www.oromia.org/hqloltu3.htm).
But because a government can not say: „Well - we know
war and do not think much of running a country
peacefully.“ - the two government started to discuss
on a different level. They discussed about a small part
along their border. The biggest part was the Badme area,
which is some 100 km² of the most marginal land. Because
the discussion about the border had never totally come to
an end, there were different possibilities of
interpretation. The EPLF wanted this territory (and small
ones) to be included into Eritrea. So, they started to
invade on the 6th of May 1998. With this kind of direct
confrontation they wanted Ethiopia to rethink its politics.
By threat of force Eritrea wanted Ethiopia to negotiate.
Ethiopia on the other hand could not accept how Eritrea
spoke with them. Both countries started to mobilise and
prepared themselves for a massive battle.
Several third parties offered their help in that period. A
delegation from the USA and Rwanda prepared a peace plan.
This plan seemed to press the guilt only on the Eritrean
side. That’s why Eritrea could not accept their
proposal of an Eritrean withdrawal. What followed where
bombings on Asmara and on Mekelle in June. The border
conflict quickly started to escalate. The diplomatic
function of the OAU that followed discussed also only the
conflict on the basis of the border conflict. No party
involved was able or willing to speak about the deeper
causes for the conflict. The UN weren’t able to
prevent an ongoing war either. The UN recommended the OAU
peace proposal and urged all nations to stop weapon deals
with the two countries. Ethiopia found this embargo
extremely provocative. They saw a parallel to the embargo
when they fought against strong Italy. In February 1999,
Ethiopia started the „operation sunset“ that
its still glory celebrated in the Media. That 3-day wave
strategy defeated the Eritrean installed troops. Eritrea
was well fixed and protected by mines. What Ethiopia did
was sending one wave of soldiers after another into the
sure death. This lasted until most mines were exploded and
the munitions on the Eritrean side had come to an end.
Ethiopia re-entered the Badme - Plains. For this little
marginal area they paid several 100,000 lives. Just like
this. So many people died - for what? So many people lost
their homes. Thousands of them hang around in the streets
in the cities. If they can still walk they go from one car
to another and try to beg. If they can not walk, they sit
and beg. And the governments do nothing to support them.
The wounds of that war will take many years to stop
bleeding and decades to heal.
And still no government is willing to change their
position. Still they use propaganda against their
neighbour. Still they point their fingers at each other.
Their relationship seem to have no realistic chance to
become better. What seems to be solved is the presented
border problem. Their hostile relationship is still the
same. It has even worsened. After the defeat of Eritrea,
the UN started to built up a security zone along their
common border. No one can say what will happen when the
international soldiers start to leave this security zone.
The history of that conflict is a good bad example for how
diplomacy can fail. Diplomacy between the two new
governments but also international diplomacy. Of course the
main responsibility lies within the two parties. And
somehow I believe that no one of them will ever accept
that. They keep on pressing the guilt on the other. How the
future of this conflict will look like, must be seen in
future. And with the current military situation in the Horn
of Africa, a next phase of the conflict is predictable.